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Post - Biomechanics 
Difference and Gender in 
Margulis and Sagan’s What Is Sex? 
Cristina S. Lopez 
Poroi
 
 
, 1, 1, January, 2001 
    
 
1 
 
The cover illustration of What Is Sex? features what is in this culture an 
instantly recognizable image.1  Moonlike, an ovum hangs in the center 
against a black background.  Off to the lower left a single sperm, its 
curved tail suggesting movement, points its head toward the egg.  This 
image depicts a moment of anticipation, just before the merger of egg 
and sperm.  As part of the cover illustration this image seems to 
function as the answer to the question posed by the title.  The 
juxtaposition of the title and this image implies a definition of “sex” 
that is necessarily linked to reproduction and a fixed dual-gender 
system.  This image of egg and sperm, which stands in for human 
females and males, suggests that when it comes to answering the 
question “what is sex?” human beings are central to the discussion. 
 
 
2 
 
Lynn Margulis, a biologist, and Dorion Sagan, a science writer (and her 
son), have written a scientific narrative that is instructive on how to 
read this image of egg and sperm ironically.  Margulis and Sagan’s 
work is grounded in the Gaia hypothesis and in a view of evolution that 
emphasizes symbiosis, interconnectedness, and cooperation rather 
than natural selection, individuality, and competition.  In their work, 
which explains the origins of sexuality from the perspective of a 
particular evolutionary theory, sex and reproduction are not 
automatically linked together.  Neither does sex or sexual reproduction 
require two “opposite” genders.  As it turns out, “male” and “female” 
are only “useful approximations.”  Furthermore this scientific narrative 
is not so narrow in its scope, for its perspective on evolution and 
sexuality is nonzoocentric.   In other words, human beings are not that 
significant in the larger scheme of things, and there is no hierarchy that 
positions different forms of life as higher or lower.   The merger of egg 
and sperm is not the moment we’ve all been waiting for, and male and 
female are not a starting point for defining “sex.” 
 
 
3 
 
Feminist critiques of science have pointed out that the image of egg 
and sperm is linked to narratives, both popular and scientific, of 
romance, entrepreneurship and warfare.2  Narratives about egg and 
sperm reinforce gender hierarchies and stereotypes; sperm are active, 
eggs are passive; sperm are athletic little soldiers on a mission to 
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conquer the egg; the egg is either a femme fatale or waits as patiently 
as Pauline to be rescued.  These and other scientific narratives about 
sperm and egg are thus implicated in binary oppositions: male/female, 
active/passive, self/other, culture/nature (to name but a few).  Donna 
Haraway explains how technoscience is involved in producing these 
dualisms: 
 
 
 
From the eighteenth to the twentieth centuries, the great 
historical constructions of gender, race and class were 
embedded in the organically marked bodies of women, the 
colonized or enslaved, and the worker.  Those inhabiting 
these marked bodies have been symbolically other to the 
fictive rational self of universal, and so unmarked, species 
man, a coherent subject.  The marked organic body has 
been a critical locus of cultural and political contestation, 
crucial both to the language of the liberatory politics of 
identity and to systems of domination drawing on widely 
shared languages of nature as a resource for the 
appropriations of culture.3 
 
 
4 
 
In this spirit, Margulis and Sagan have written a powerful 
counternarrative that calls into question the very idea of the coherent 
subject and radically reconceptualizes gender in terms of multiplicity 
rather than binary oppositions.  In their work, Margulis and Sagan 
provide an explanation of a new perspective on evolution and sex that 
is grounded in the following ideas:  a taxonomy that is inclusive of all 
forms of life, including microbial life, and a view of evolution that 
emphasizes symbiosis over adaptation and cooperation over 
competition.  At the same time, the authors provide a critique of the 
dominant perspective in evolutionary theory generally known as neo-
Darwinianism.   As I shall show in this essay, the shift from neo-
Darwinism to the “new biology” has a potentially transformative effect 
on evolutionary narratives both in terms of their scope and in terms of 
the way they imagine relationships between actors, both human and 
non-human.  In my view, an understanding of this shift is crucial for 
understanding the implications of Margulis and Sagan’s work. 
 Throughout I will discuss examples that make appearances in the 
authors' work, such as gene-trading bacteria, tiny creatures that live in 
the hindguts of termites, exclusively female whiptail lizards, and 
androgynous hyenas.  Through a neo-Darwinian lens, these examples 
might be considered mere curiosities; it might be tempting to believe 
that they have little to do with human beings.  From a Gaian 
perspective, however, with its potentially destabilizing narrative, the 
same examples are mobilized into a radical revision of gender and the 
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self. 
 
 
 The Ground is Stirring Under Our Feet4  
 
5 
 
In the opening pages of What Is Sex? the authors ask, “Why is sex so 
misunderstood?  Is it because no one knows its history?”  To 
characterize the book as a history of sex is useful, for it does progress 
chronologically and explains the origins of sexual activity and the ways 
in which sexual systems have evolved.  However, in contrast to some 
neo-Darwinian accounts, What Is Sex? does not chronicle progress 
toward standard metazoosexuality, but omnidirectional 
transformations.  Furthermore the history of sex begins with bacteria.  
This is an unusual move, but as Sagan explains, “four fifths of the 
history of life on Earth has solely been a bacterial phenomenon. 
 Moreover, all plants, animals and fungi and the miscellaneous 
eukaryotic kingdom known as protocists are bacterial in nature.”5  
Indeed Margulis and Sagan are fond of pointing out that “bacteria are 
biochemically and metabolically far more diverse than all plants and 
animals put together. Their natural history is so bizarre that they 
would have excited huge interest were they discovered in outer space 
rather than beneath our feet.”6 
 
 
6 
 
The authors’ nonzoocentric perspective widens the scope of traditional 
evolutionary narratives and transforms relationships between actors, 
both human and non-human.  In particular their narrative is informed 
by two theoretical developments:  a new taxonomy for the classification 
of life; and the Gaia hypothesis, which emphasizes interconnectedness 
over autonomy and cooperation over competition.  In this section, I 
will explain these developments and the ways in which they transform 
scientific narratives about evolution and sex. 
 
 
7 
 
Margulis and Sagan’s nonzoocentric perspective is informed by a 
taxonomy that posits five kingdoms.  In the book Five Kingdoms:  An 
Illustrated Guide to the Phyla of Life on Earth, co-authored by Lynn 
Margulis and Karlene Schwartz, the authors explain that from the time 
of Aristotle until around the mid-twentieth century, the dominant 
system for classifying forms of life involved only two kingdoms, plant 
and animal.7  More recently, biologists have shifted to new taxonomies 
that are able to account for life forms that were not easily classifiable in 
the old schema, such as bacteria, fungi, and slime molds.  Margulis is a 
proponent of a system of five kingdoms: kingdom bacteria, kingdom 
protocista, kingdom fungi, kingdom animalia, and kingdom plantae.  
There are also two “superkingdoms.”  Prokaryotes, or bacteria, do not 
have nucleated cells.  Eukaryotes, the superkingdom that encompasses 
all other forms of life on earth, have nucleated cells.  The “lack” of the 
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nucleus in bacterial cells should not be taken as a disadvantage, and 
neither should cells with nuclei be understood as a progression from 
more “primitive” forms. An important feature of the five kingdom 
taxonomy is that it is not merely additive.  In other words, it does not 
simply account for more forms of life while at the same time preserving 
a hierarchical view of “higher” and “lower” forms of life.  That there are 
no “higher” or “lower” forms of life has implications for human beings 
who are accustomed to thinking of themselves at the apex of a great 
chain of being.8  As we shall see, bacteria with non-nucleated cells have 
been powerful agents of change, and without them life as we know it 
wouldn’t exist.  The shift in perspective involved in this new taxonomy 
is important in the authors' reconceptualization of gender and the self. 
 
8 
 
While this new taxonomy repositions human beings in Margulis and 
Sagan’s scientific narrative about sex and evolution, the Gaia 
hypothesis also emphasizes cooperative and interconnected 
relationships among all forms of life, human beings included.  The Gaia 
hypothesis was developed by James Lovelock and named by the 
novelist William Golding.  Despite its poetic name and the figure of a 
maternal Earth, the Gaia hypothesis is most decidedly a scientific 
theory.9  From a Gaian perspective, the Earth and all living organisms 
are “autopoietic.”  Autopoiesis is a fundamental principle of the Gaia 
hypothesis and a replacement for “neo-Darwinian mechanics.”10 
 Autopoietic systems are self-bounded, self-maintaining, and self-
perpetuating, unlike mechanistic systems that do not create and 
maintain their own boundaries.  As the authors explain it, the Earth’s 
atmosphere is analogous to a circulatory system, which was created 
and continues to be maintained by life, especially microbial life.  
Contrary to a neo-Darwinian perspective, the Earth is not just an inert 
scene to which living beings adapt and find their niche.11  Instead the 
activity of living beings constitutes the very context in which evolution 
occurs.  Furthermore, from the perspective of the new biology, the 
more important and interesting evolutionary changes occur not 
through selection or adaptation but through symbiosis, a “prolonged 
physical association between two or more different organisms 
belonging to different species.”12  While neo-Darwinian narratives 
imagine living beings engaged in competition for scarce resources, 
Gaian narratives imagine them working in concert to maintain the 
autopoietic system that is the Earth.  Instead of privileging 
autonomous individuality, the Gaia hypothesis emphasizes 
interconnected relationships. 
 
 
9 
 
In the Gaian scene, human beings are not very important.  This is not 
just a question of sheer numbers, or of an assumption that bacteria are 
more interesting and bizarre than we are.  It has to do with our  
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relatively late arrival and the relatively unimportant role we play in 
creating and maintaining the Earth as an autopoietic system.  Bacteria 
were here first, and “from a Gaian point of view animals, all of which 
are covered with and invaded by gas-exchanging microbes, may simply 
be a convenient way to distribute these microbes more numerously and 
evenly over the surface of the globe.”13  Human beings consume the 
Earth’s resources in the form of food and air as well as oil and silicon, 
and produce waste as individuals and as communities. However, our 
impact on the environment is slight in comparison to that of bacteria.  
As the authors explain, without bacteria “we would have no air to 
breathe, no nitrogen in our food, no soil in which to grow crops.”14  
Human beings do not have the same capacity to create the conditions 
necessary for life.  Although the activities of human beings are 
destructive to other forms of life, we do not have the capacity to destroy 
life itself.15  Bacteria were here long before us, and certainly will 
survive us. 
 
 
 Why Must Our Bodies End at the Skin?16  
 
10 
 
As if it weren’t enough that humans have been ousted from their 
position at the center and endpoint of evolutionary narratives, 
Margulis and Sagan also call into question the very idea of the 
autonomous, self-bounded individual.  As Sagan puts it, the “zoological 
‘I’” is open to radical revision.17  That is because of the new biology’s 
focus on symbiosis rather than adaptation.  Because of the multiple 
symbiotic relationships in which all living creatures are involved, it is 
difficult to determine where one individual leaves off and another 
begins.  In the case of bacteria, it may be problematic even to think of 
them as individuals, or even species, and it has been proposed that 
bacteria constitute a superorganism that spans the entire earth.18 
 
 
11 
 
Humans and animals might be unwitting vehicles for gas-exchanging 
microbes, but the relationships created through symbiosis are much 
more intimate than that.  One example cited often in Margulis and 
Sagan’s work is Mixotricha paradoxa, a protocist that lives in the 
hindgut of a south Australian termite.  The termite depends on the 
protocist for survival because without M. paradoxa, the termite would 
not be able to digest wood.  In turn, this protocist depends on 
spirochete bacteria for survival.  In great numbers, the bacteria attach 
themselves to the protocist and continuously propel it forward, literally 
keeping the protocist from falling out of the termite.  Although the 
bacteria, protocist, and termite all maintain reproductive 
independence, they exist in a permanent cooperative relationship with 
each other.19 
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12 
 
In a narrative that does not advocate hierarchies of life forms, 
Mixotricha paradoxa cannot be dismissed as a curiosity, or “lower” 
form of life that is not like us.  In any case, termites are not the only 
organisms involved in prolonged, mutually beneficial relationships 
with other living creatures.  According to Margulis, symbiotic 
relationships that developed long ago may have played a crucial role in 
the development of human bodies.  The same fast-swimming 
spirochete bacteria that keep Mixotricha paradoxa from falling out of 
the termite may also have played a role, for example, in the 
development of motility in human sperm cells, when long ago 
symbiotic mergers between the bacteria and the sperm cells created the 
tail that propels the sperm through the reproductive tract.21  Margulis 
and Sagan even speculate that scientists can find the origins of human 
consciousness itself in bacteria.  In the context of Margulis and Sagan's 
work, the story is a familiar one.  “I hypothesize that all these 
phenomena of mind, from perception to consciousness, originated 
from the unholy microscopic alliance between hungry killer bacteria 
and their potential archaebacterial victims.”21  Fast-swimming, active 
spirochetes invaded the slower-moving archaebacteria, who fought off 
the infection by absorbing their potential killers.  Neither type of 
bacteria died; instead both survived in a symbiotic relationship for 
some one thousand million years.  Margulis argues that our nerve cells 
are the product of such mergers.  The movements of our nerve cells, 
the connections they make when we exercise our memory, suggest the 
movements of spirochetal remnants. 
 
 
13 
 
Although the Gaia hypothesis and its associated evolutionary theory 
have the effect of redrawing the boundaries of the individual, the self-
bounded individual has not been dissolved entirely.  In the discourses 
that imagine an autonomous body with clearly demarcated boundaries 
(such as neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory), these boundaries are 
often imagined to be epidermal.  To use Margaret Morse’s phrase, 
human beings have a “skin ego,” or “envelope of identity and self.”22  
The idea of a skin ego often is linked with the idea that the presence of 
bacteria in the body is a sign of infection and a transgression of the 
body’s boundaries.  This is not the case in Margulis and Sagan’s 
work.  Often what begins as an invasion of “predatory bacteria” is 
transformed into a necessary, beneficial, and permanent symbiotic 
relationship.  In this context, the boundaries of the body become more 
permeable.  Furthermore the boundaries of living beings always are 
changing.  “Through their membranes, skins and orifices they connect 
with their surroundings and each other . . . Organisms are far less 
independent individuals than modern neo-Darwinian biology has 
assumed.”23 
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14 
 
Moreover our bodies are characterized as “open thermodynamic 
systems.”  The authors explain:  
 
 
 
individual organisms are open to both energy and 
materials flowing through them.  Indeed the most basic 
parts of living – eating, breathing, excreting, sex – attest to 
our status as open thermodynamic systems.  It is probably 
no coincidence that the most natural pleasures – such as 
thrusting, coming, sneezing, drinking, eating, defecating, 
urinating, sunbathing, sweating and perhaps even music 
and vision as the aesthetic delights of sound entering the 
ear or light waves dancing through the back holes of our 
pupils to create visual impressions at the back of our 
retinas – tend to involve orifices and flows.24 
 
 
  
 
The authors, however, go considerably farther when they assert 
that the self-bounded individual is an illusion defined by 
informational closure.  Names, identifying numbers, and titles 
distinguish us as individuals, and this “closure is exacerbated by 
the American ethos of individualism.”25  For Margulis and Sagan, 
individuality is defined in terms of the cybernetic concept of 
autopoiesis and thus the idea of the “skin ego” has not disappeared 
entirely but has been redefined.  Moreover Margulis and Sagan’s 
view of the body is affirmative in the sense that it is imagined in 
terms of its abilities to make connections and undergo 
transformations. 
 
 
 
 Three Sexual Systems  
 
15 
 
This affirmative view of the body is connected to a view of sex that 
involves three sexual systems, and one in which reproduction is 
not the only result of sexual activity.  Accordingly I will discuss 
three sexual systems, their relationship to the revision of the 
“zoological ‘I’” and the beginnings of the destabilization of a dual-
gendered system.  It turns out that the answer to the question 
“What is sex?” is much more complicated than the cover 
illustration suggests.  When Margulis and Sagan define sex, they 
do not begin with either reproduction or gender, but with “gene 
transfer.”  There are three distinct kinds of sexual systems: 
 
 
 
 
The first to evolve was the unidirectional type of 
bacterial sex that led to survival of a finely tuned 
global bacterial ecological network.   Then, a highly 
specific form of symbiotic hypersex helped form our 
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nucleated ancestors, the protocists.  Most recently in 
protocist ancestors to fungi, plants and animals the 
most familiar form of sex evolved:  meiotic and 
fertilization sex involving cell fusion.  These were all 
necessary preludes to gendered bodies, such as 
ourselves.26 
 
16 
 
Transgenic sex in bacteria developed as a shortcut to survival.  
Under stressful conditions, bacteria trade genes.  “Bacterial sex 
allowed them to change, not only by accumulating mutations, but 
by receiving genes from their separately evolved, transgenic 
neighbors.”27  Transgenic bacterial sex reveals a bizarre natural 
history.  Bacteria trade their genes often and easily and do not 
confine themselves to their own species.  The authors use 
numerous analogies to illustrate how remarkable is transgenic 
bacterial sex:  “If eukaryotes could trade genes as fluidly as do 
bacteria, it would be a small matter for dandelions to sprout 
butterfly wings, collide with a bee, exchange genes again and soon 
be seeing with compound insect eyes.”28  There are many kinds of 
bacterial gene transfer, but the important thing to keep in mind is 
that life itself depends on transgenic sex, as transgenic sex in 
bacteria transformed the planet “from a sterile, hostile place into 
one rich with a variety of abundant life.”29  Transgenic sex is not 
just a curiosity and does not only affect the bacteria that engage in 
it. 
 
 
17 
 
The second sexual system, hypersex, also ignores the human taboo 
of interspecies sex.  Hypersex, unlike other forms of sex, is not a 
temporary encounter, but a “permanent merging through 
symbiosis to make organisms with genes from more than a single 
source.”30  Transgenic sex is only a bacterial phenomenon; 
hypersex is not.  The authors explain: 
 
 
 
 
Bacterial unions are the foundation of each animal cell 
in your body and in each of the cells of plants.  Your 
constituent cells are hypersex hybrids .  . . . Cells 
contain tiny organelles called mitochondria which 
produce energy for the cell by metabolizing oxygen.  
These microscopic mitochondria were once free living, 
oxygen-breathing bacteria.  In the early days before 
any animals, plants or fungi had evolved, small 
predatory bacteria, adept at breathing oxygen, 
probably forced their way into larger fermenting cells 
(protocists) with no such capability.  With time the 
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invading agents became mitochondria.  They 
permanently “mated.”31 
 
  
 
The merger of spirochete bacteria and human cells, which may 
have resulted in sperm motility and human consciousness, were 
acts of hypersex.  Again hypersex is not just a curiosity but also has 
been crucial to our own evolution and survival. 
 
 
18 
 
The third sexual system, fertilization or “fusion” sex, is the most 
familiar system to us, since this is how human beings and many 
other animals reproduce.  Our bodily cells are normally diploid, 
with two sets of chromosomes.  Sperm and egg cells are haploid, 
with only one set of chromosomes.  The process of creating the 
haploid sperm and egg from diploid cells called spermatocytes and 
oocytes is called meiosis.  “In animals sperm and eggs that 
eventually find each other, fuse, and form fertilized eggs that form 
embryos.  Haploidy, ending in fertilization, and diploidy, ending in 
meiosis, form the central cycle of the life history of animals.”32 
 
 
19 
 
Just as the zoological “I” is open to radical revision, so too is the 
human dual-gender system.  The same scientific narratives that 
destabilize the self-bounded individual radically destabilize the 
idea of two genders.  Our unimportance and late arrival to the 
Gaian scene puts things in perspective, as gender is not necessary 
for sex to occur.  Bacteria, which have long engaged in acts of 
transgenic sex and hypersex, are not gendered.33  Even the third 
sexual system, fusion sex, does not require two genders.  Whiptail 
lizards, for example, which are exclusively female, manage to 
reproduce through the fusion of female haploid cells.34 
 
 
20 
 
The authors go on to speculate that our system of reproductive sex, 
which depends on a dual-gender system, could very well change in 
the future.  Margulis and Sagan imagine a future in which even 
human males might not be needed for reproduction.  Perhaps the 
human dual-gendered system might reverse or disappear entirely 
over the course of evolution.  Or it might be that in the future, only 
a small percentage of the population will reproduce:  “Sexual 
intercourse now prerequisite to reproduction may be co-opted for 
other roles in future human collectives.”35  Although in the present 
the link between sex and reproduction is imagined to be fairly 
strong, over the course of evolution the link could weaken.36 
 
 
21 
 
Margulis and Sagan look to the past as well as the future to 
destabilize what is thought to be a fixed and necessary two-gender 
system.  As it turns out, two genders, male and female, are effects  
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of evolution, and not so tightly linked to fusion sex that one is not 
possible without the other.  Fusion sex long preceded humans and 
other animals.  Two billion years ago, in times of stress, single-
celled protocists merged in order to survive.  The haploid 
protocists survived in a doubled or even tripled state.  Sometimes 
the mergers weren’t successful and the protocists died.  At first, 
there were no significant differences between the mating 
protocists, but over time, differences evolved.  In other words: 
 
 
 
Protocists, whose males (or other mates) look the 
same as females (or other mates), detect each other by 
very subtle cues.  In the beginning, with cells as their 
only bodies, no specialized genitals or swimming 
propagules existed.  Early mates looked just like each 
other.  Over time, and separately and in many 
lineages, equal single cells became distinct and 
unequal.  Ultimately, anigosgamy appeared in the 
form of small sperm and large eggs.  With time 
different sorts of mating bodies evolved.37 
 
 
  
 
Gender itself evolved, and over time the gender systems we know 
might change.  A dual gender system is only one of many 
possibilities.  In the next section, I will consider both the 
possibilities and limitations of Margulis and Sagan's 
reconceptualization of gender. 
 
 
 
 The Specter Of Neo-Darwinianism  
 
22 
 
“Strange Attractions:  Sex and Perception” is the penultimate 
chapter of What Is Sex?  Its focus is decidedly zoocentric, with 
discussion of examples including various species of birds and apes, 
damselflys, and human beings.  Absent from this chapter is the 
focus on microbial life, symbiosis, and cooperative relationships 
that characterizes the rest of the book.  The point here is not to 
criticize the authors for this absence, but rather to illustrate the 
ways in which the tensions between neo-Darwinian and Gaian 
perspectives manifest themselves in this particular chapter.  Here 
the focus tends to shift more towards neo-Darwinian perspectives, 
and representations of gender and the self are the most 
problematic. 
 
 
23 
 
In “Strange Attractions,” Margulis and Sagan “explore the wider 
context of meiotic [reproductive] sex, then move on to traits, 
including those of our own species, which have arisen in the wake  
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of sexual reproduction.”38  This chapter explains, from the 
perspective of evolutionary theory, how animals (humans 
included) have developed characteristics that members of their 
own species find sexually attractive.  In other words, when it 
comes to sexual attraction, appearances do count.  The authors 
explain that perception plays an important role in the selection of 
prospective mates because, although it is advantageous for 
individuals to choose the best mate, they can’t detect genotypes, or 
“DNA making up the genes in the chromosomes of a prospective 
mate.”  Instead we must rely on phenotypes, “or how genes are 
expressed to make the whole animal.”39  Humans and other 
animals read outward appearances in each other as signs of fitness 
to reproduce and to be effective parents.  This is so because the 
development of desirable traits evolved in a context in which 
relationships between animals of the same species are competitive 
rather than cooperative.  When Margulis and Sagan set up the 
chapter, accordingly, they begin with an explanation of sperm 
competition theory, which posits that over the course of evolution 
males of a given species develop strategies as they compete with 
each other to fertilize the females.40  As evolutionary biologist 
Robin Baker puts it, sperm competition is the “process by which 
sperm from different males duke it out inside the female to win the 
right to fertilize the egg.”41  According to sperm competition 
theory, “reproductive success” is the goal of sex, which for males 
means siring as many offspring as possible and for females 
selecting the mate who will be the best provider. 
 
24 
 
Oddly the critique of neo-Darwinian perspectives that is so 
prominent elsewhere in Margulis and Sagan’s writing is absent 
from their discussion of sperm competition, sex, and perception.  
Sperm competition theory is heavily implicated in the idea of the 
autonomous individual with clearly demarcated boundaries, 
cost/benefit analyses of various types of sexual acts and behaviors, 
the selfish protection of genetic investments, and defines bodies 
through extended metaphors of capitalism and warfare.  Yet in 
“Strange Attractions,” sperm competition theory is reiterated as a 
scientific theory that accounts for the relationship between sex and 
perception. 
 
 
25 
 
In their further discussion of human beings and attraction, in fact, 
the authors reinforce some fairly traditional ideas.  For example, 
they argue that both “the Renaissance ideal of healthy plumpness 
[in women]” and the “slim supermodel” are “examples of features 
favored by sexual selection.”  They continue, “Perhaps, in times of 
relatively limited resources, the bodies of wide-hipped plump 
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women indicate a potentially greater ability to bear and nurse 
infants.  Alternately in modern, more densely populated urban 
cultures, slimness may indicate women who are easier and less 
expensive to support.”42  This example naturalizes what are 
arbitrary and hierarchical social arrangements:  whether in the 
Renaissance or in contemporary society, men are responsible for 
supporting women financially, while women primarily are 
responsible for bearing children and caring for them.  In the 
example about pelicans that follows, it is the male pelican that is 
judged in terms of his appearance.  However, this is not a reversal; 
even in the animal kingdom the male is the breadwinner as the 
male pelican is judged in terms of how well he appears to be able 
to catch fish.  All of this could readily be found in the most 
masculinist neo-Darwinian exercise in sociobiology. 
 
 
 Sexual Dimorphism and Reversing Genders  
 
26 
 
In spite of examples such as “slim supermodels,” the chapter does 
question the idea of a fixed, dual gender system through a 
discussion about sexual dimorphism, though not entirely 
successfully.  Sexual dimorphism is defined in this book as “body 
size and form, behavior and/or metabolic differences in males and 
females belonging to the same species.”43  Margulis and Sagan are 
certainly not the first within the sciences to turn their attention to 
the question of sexual dimorphism.  As Donna Haraway 
comments, “There is no region of the body, living or dead, soft 
tissue or bony, that has not been interrogated for the secrets of sex 
and sexual difference.  The construction of organic sexual 
difference has been a major discursive production.”44  Feminists 
are interested in the problem of sexual dimorphism because the 
idea has been mobilized to justify hierarchical gendered social 
relations and because it reinscribes the dichotomous, culturally 
constructed categories “masculine” and “feminine.”45  The authors’ 
discussion of hyenas and human beings is particularly relevant on 
this point. 
 
 
27 
 
The final example discussed in “Strange Attractions” is the hyena, 
whose apparent lack of sexual dimorphism is, from a human 
perspective at the least, puzzling, and at the worst monstrous.  
Interestingly, although the topic in question still is “sex and 
perception,” the point of view has shifted.  In the case of hyenas, 
the authors do not talk about the selection of desirable traits in 
hyenas from the hyena's point of view.46  Instead hyenas are 
discussed from the point of view of anxious humans confronted 
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with the apparent sexual ambiguity of hyenas.  As the authors 
explain, the differences between male and female hyenas are quite 
subtle; both male and female hyenas appear to have a penis.  So 
subtle are these differences, in fact, that the problem of sexual 
difference in hyenas was not resolved by scientists until the early 
1990s.  The authors do not discuss whether puzzled scientists 
studied hyenas closely in order to determine sexual difference 
based on other characteristics such as brain size, bone structure, 
hormone levels, or gendered divisions of labor.  They do, however, 
mention that the female hyenas are vicious hunters.  I wonder 
whether scientific anxiety about hyenas is actually a reaction to the 
apparent masculinization of the female hyena.  As it turns out, the 
female of the species does not really have a penis; she has a large 
clitoris and lacks a vagina.  Nevertheless hyenas manage to 
reproduce and perpetuate their species.  In what must be a painful 
process, female hyenas give birth along the length of the urethra 
and through the clitoris.  The authors close the example, and the 
chapter, with the assertion that although hyenas might seem 
strange to humans, for their species they are “perfectly normal.” 
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From the point of view of a feminist critic, I have mixed reactions 
to this chapter on sex and perception, in particular to the 
discussion of sexual dimorphism.  On one hand, Margulis and 
Sagan's assertion that “genders evolve and maybe even ‘reverse’ 
over time” problematizes what have been essentialist and 
deterministic views elsewhere in evolutionary theory and 
biology.47  The authors themselves hint at the problem that has 
occupied many feminist critics:  science's tendencies to read 
cultural constructions of gender onto human and animal bodies.  
As they explain it, the problem is not the hyenas themselves, but a 
limited human perspective that finds it difficult to imagine 
possibilities much beyond “our straight and narrow view.”  On the 
other hand, while Margulis and Sagan problematize the idea of a 
fixed, dual gender system, they have a tendency here to reinscribe 
and naturalize the dualistic cultural categories “masculine” and 
“feminine.” 
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The hyena is not just an odd case of gender reversal or ambiguity. 
 Margulis and Sagan argue that perhaps gender reversal will occur 
in humans, at least in terms of sexually dimorphic characteristics.  
As the authors explain it, successful human males currently 
display the same “dominant dimorphic characteristics” as 
silverback gorillas:  “large size, solid musculature useful in jealous 
combat, male pattern baldness, coarse hair, dark hair and/or skin, 
low voice, gruff manner, beard, mustache, side burns and 
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patterned streaks of gray hair.”48  The authors also assert, 
however, that as social arrangements change, displaying the 
characteristics of the “alpha male” becomes less important and it 
becomes more and more advantageous for men to “soften” their 
appearance.  The problem is that these characteristics of the “new 
male” are characterized as “signs of youth and childlike 
femininity.”49  As this example implies, male humans become 
either more masculine or more feminine.  There is little room for 
ambiguity, or for imagining something else entirely.  Genders 
might reverse, but the dichotomous categories “masculine” and 
“feminine” remain intact and uninterrogated. 
 
 
 Fifty Thousand Genders  
 
30 
 
Nonetheless the book as a whole, with its nonzoocentric 
perspective, suggests further possibilities for rethinking gender.  
For example, the definition of gender that appears in the glossary 
destabilizes the male/female binary and the idea of a fixed system 
of “opposite” sexes: 
 
 
 
 
Differences between any two complementary 
organisms that render them capable of mating.  
Organisms of different gender potentially mate while 
those of the same gender cannot mate to form fertile 
offspring.  Many species include healthy organisms of 
hundreds, even thousands of genders.  In some, 
gender (mating type) differences are determined by 
tiny changes; specific genes and proteins on the 
surface of mushroom threads (hyphae) give over 
50,000 genders in the common fungus, 
Schizophyllum.  The bewildering series of genders in 
ciliates that depend on tiny chemical genetic 
differences in undulipodial surface proteins (ciliary 
antigens) give rise to genders that may change in a 
daily cycle.  Maleness and femaleness commonly 
associated with fertilization by ansiogamy where male 
individuals produce many small, swimming gametes 
(i.e., sperm) while females produce fewer, larger food-
storing gametes (i.e., eggs) is just one of many natural 
systems.50 
 
 
  
 
There are a number of points worth emphasizing here, the first of 
which is that this nonzoocentric definition of gender does not 
begin with a binary opposition between male and female.  This  
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definition reinforces the authors’ use of the term “gender” with its 
connotations of contingency as opposed to a fixed system.  
Margulis and Sagan's definition of gender is akin to Elizabeth 
Grosz' discussion of gender and difference:  “a difference capable 
of being understood outside the dominance or regime of the One, 
the self-same, the imaginary play of mirrors and doubles, the 
structure of binary pairs in which what is different can be 
understood only as a variation or negation of identity.”51 
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Since Margulis and Sagan’s definition of gender does not begin 
with the male/female binary, “male” can no longer function as a 
stable point of reference, and “female” no longer is constituted as 
“symbolically other to the fictive self of universal and so 
unmarked, species man, a coherent subject.”52  In this system, 
there are not just two genders, or even a third “intermediate” 
gender, but multiple genders that in some forms of life number in 
the hundreds, or tens of thousands.  What is remarkable about this 
definition of gender is not simply that there are so many possible 
genders, but the ways in which the authors talk about difference.  
And again a more affirmative view of the body emerges, one that is 
grounded in multiplicity.  As Grosz further explains, multiplicity 
does not merely mean “many” or “plural,” but identities that are 
defined in terms of their potential to make connections and 
undergo transformations rather than maintain their sameness over 
time. 
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Margulis and Sagan’s history of sex, with its affirmative view of the 
body and its radical reconceptualization of gender, can be 
mobilized to address the problem of biological determinism.  
Biological determinism is a “form of reductionism in that it 
explains the behaviors and characteristics of societies in terms of 
biology.”53  For feminists, biodeterministic claims are problematic 
because they naturalize socially constituted hierarchies of gender 
and race.  The weight of biodeterministic claims depends in part 
on the considerable cultural authority of biological discourse.  The 
power of biodeterministic claims that justify gendered social 
relations depends on the idea that underneath culturally 
constituted gender, there is a fixed system of two “biological” 
sexes.  The term commonly used, “biological sex,” with its 
conflation of the terms “biology” and “nature,” attests to the 
authority of biological discourse.  Feminist theorists, both inside 
and outside of the sciences, have written extensively about the 
problem of biological determinism.  Margulis and Sagan’s work 
presents the opportunity for a fresh approach to this problem.  The 
authors (particularly Margulis, who is a working scientist) do not 
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give up biology's considerable cultural authority.  Instead, they call 
into question the idea of a fixed system of two “biological” 
sexes.  In addition to the assertion that genders might change or 
reverse over time, their use of language reinforces the idea that 
gender is contingent.  Consistently throughout the book, the term 
“gender” always refers to “difference”while the term “sex” always 
refers to “gene transfer.”  The binary sex/gender has been severed, 
and in this story about evolution and sex it is no longer possible to 
posit a deterministic relationship between “biological sex” and 
“culturally constituted gender.”  Therefore Margulis and Sagan’s 
narrative about evolution and sex makes biodeterministic claims 
about hierarchical gendered social relations less tenable.  
Admittedly it might be a very long time before genders in human 
beings reverse or change.54  But this scientific narrative, with its 
nonzoocentric perspective, argues that our current gender system 
is only one of many existing and viable alternatives. 
 
 
 Sperm and Egg Reconsidered  
 
33 
 
In light of the evolutionary narrative produced from the 
perspective of the new biology, the cover illustration of What Is 
Sex? invites a different reading.  The connection between the 
image of sperm and egg and narratives of romance, 
entrepreneurship and warfare is weakened, and this image is 
positioned in relation to a narrative told from the perspective of 
the Gaia hypothesis, evolution through symbiosis and cooperative 
relationships.  The same evolutionary narrative that displaces 
human beings from its center also displaces reproductive sex from 
its center.  Although reproductive sex is important to us and other 
species, so-called “fusion sex” is only one of three possible sexual 
systems.  Moreover, when it comes to maintaining the autopoietic 
system that is the Earth, transgenic sex and hypersex have been 
and will continue to be far more important than reproductive 
sex.  Reproductive sex might serve our own selfish interests, but 
transgenic sex transformed the Earth itself from a sterile and 
hostile environment into a living system abundant with life.  
Hypersex transformed human, animal and plant bodies and 
created permanent, mutually beneficial relationships that 
transcend the boundaries between species.  From a Gaian point of 
view, defining “sex” in terms of reproduction seems not only 
erroneous, but also overly self-interested. 
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Moreover this evolutionary narrative presents possibilities for 
transforming bodies, gender and the self.  Sperm and egg, which  
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synechdochally have stood in for human males and human 
females, can no longer signify autonomous individuals that 
cooperate with each other only occasionally with the goal of 
protecting their genetic investments.  For one thing, it is difficult 
to determine where one individual leaves off and another begins.  
The sperm in its present form may be the product of an act of 
hypersex that took place long ago – thanks to fast-moving 
spirochete bacteria, the sperm can propel itself through the 
reproductive tract.  Similarly human and other bodies have been 
transformed by other acts of hypersex in some interesting and 
important ways.  According to Margulis and Sagan’s scientific 
narrative, we are not autonomous, self-bounded individuals and 
never were.  Furthermore the merger of sperm and egg can no 
longer be read as the merger of opposites.  As it turns out, male egg 
and female sperm are not in a fixed, dualistic relationship, but 
male and female are “useful approximations.”  The anomalous 
chapter on sex and perception demonstrates the limitations of a 
dualistic system in which the only possibility for change is to 
reverse.  The larger narrative, however, presents an affirmative 
view of gender and the body that is more concerned with making 
connections and undergoing transformations than the 
reproduction and maintenance of the self. 
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The shift from neo-Darwinianism to the “new biology” would have 
a transformative effect on evolutionary narratives in terms of their 
scope and the way in which they imagine relationships between 
actors, both human and non-human.  An understanding of a 
taxonomy involving five kingdoms, the Gaia hypothesis, and their 
transformative effects on evolutionary narratives is crucial for 
understanding the implications of Margulis and Sagan’s work. 
 Otherwise the three sexual systems, bodies that are products of 
symbiotic relationships and genders that reverse over time might 
seem merely curiosities or anomalies for human beings who are 
accustomed to imagining themselves in terms of an autonomous 
body, a fixed, dual-gender system and one sexual system.  
However, in this story human beings are no longer the point of 
reference against which all other life is measured.  In What Is Sex? 
Lynn Margulis and Dorion Sagan have produced a “mutated” 
evolutionary narrative that provides a compelling alternative to 
constraining dualisms and self-centered perspectives.55 
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